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This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information, 
when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible. For a 
general set of customer characteristics, it is shown that in the presence of contract adminis- 
tration costs, offering fixed-fee pricing in addition to a non-linear usage-based pricing scheme 
is always profit-improving, and there may be markets in which a pure fixed-fee is optimal. 
Moreover, it is proved that the opt,imal usage-based pricing schedule is independent of the 
value of the fixed-fee. These results imply that the optimal pricing strategy is never fully 
revealing. A procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed-fee and non-linear 
i~sage-based contracts is presented. 
Applying these general results to specific: bnsiness contexts suggests a number of operiG 
tional guidelines for designing pricing schedules, and managerial insights for setting pricing 
policy. For instance, in nascent information markets, firms are most likely to profit from low 
fixed-fee penetration pricing, but as these markets mature, the optimal pricing mix should 
expand to include a wider range of usage-based pricing options. The effects of changes in 
product value and administration costs on the adoption levels of different pricing schemes, 
optimal quantity discounts, firm profitability and total welfare are analyzed. Strategic pric- 
ing responses to changes in market characteristics are described, and the implications of the 
paper's results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed. 
1 Introduction 
Non-linear usage-based pricing is a popular price-discrimination technique, and has been 
analyzed extensively in the context of the electricity and long-distance telephone markets 
(Wilson, 1993). Many producers of information goods have also adopted this form of pricing. 
For instance, most corporate software manufacturers tie the prices of their products to the 
total processing speed of the servers on which the software is licensed to run, which indirectly 
bases the price paid by the customer on the total expected usage of the software. The 
emergence of application service providers has enabled a variety of more direct usage-based 
pricing schemes for software prodncts'. All the major cellular telephone service providers 
have extensive menus of usage-based pricing plans. Many research firms price their services 
on a per-report basis. 
In contrast, there are numerous examples of fixed-fe pricing for information goods, 
under which customers pay a fixed price that is independent of usage. Most Internet service 
providers charge their residential customers a flat monthly subscription fee. Jupiter Media- 
Metrix charges its clients $22,000 per year, independent of research usage. The Wall Street 
Journal offers unlimited access to its online version for a fixed annual fee. NetFlix gives 
its consumers unlimited DVD rentals for a flat fee of $20 per month. These fixed-fees are 
feasible because the firm selling the product incurs low or zero direct variable costs from 
increases in product usage. 
Additionally, a number of companies have started using a combination of fixed-fee and 
i~sag+baseri pricing. For instance, IBM recently introduced options for both usage-based 
and flat-fee pricing on its zSeries software. Under this new pricing model, a customer can 
opt to pay a fixed fee, or to use a reporting tool2 from IBM which tracks software usage on 
a monthly basis, and under which the customer may adjust their desired maximum usage 
periodically. Hewlett-Packard has announced that it will add pay-per-use pricing to its 
futed-fee schedules for its Superdome and Netserver family of servers, charging customers 
based on the monthly average of the daily maximum active processors. In addition to its 
regular per-minute pricing scheme, Sprint oIfers a fixed-fee residential long-distance pIa11. 
Other information goods that feature both fixed-fee and transaction-based pricing include 
the OCLC information services used by most major libraries and Internet bandwidth, where 
a mixture of usage-independent and per-Mbps pricing structures is common. 
These pricing policies which include fixed-fee options conflict with results from nonlinear 
pricing theory (Maskin and Riley, 1984, Wilson, 1993), which have shown that under some 
fairly general assumptions, the optimal pricing policy for a monopolist should always be 
strictly based on usage, and will be fully revealing. This disconnect between pricing theory 
and practice, though puzzling, could be due to one or more of the following reasons. These 
theoretical results may not apply to markets for information goods, where variable costs from 
usage are zero. These models may ignore transaction or administration costs associated with 
usage-based pricing, which make fixed-fees preferable in practice. Perhaps there are specific 
customer characteristics which favor fixed-fee pricing, and others which favor usage-based 
pricing. It is also possible that many industry pricing schemes are simply flawed. These are 
currently unresolved research questions, which this paper addresses. 
Specifically, this paper models pricing decisions by a monopolist in a market for informa- 
tion goods, with customer heterogeneity and asymmetric information. Under fairly general 
assumptions about customer utility functions and preference distributions, the optimal com- 
bination of the unlimited usage fixed-fee and the usage-based nonlinear pricing fiinction is 
derived. We establish that any positive cost of monitoring usage causes the monopolist to 
offer customers a fixed-fee option. It is shown that the choice of the usage-based pricing 
function is independent of the fixed-fee. In the process, we generalize and add to some 
recent results about renting versus buying information goods (Varian, 2000). The general 
formulation is applied to two examples, and the sensitivity of a number of variables (the 
level of the fixed fee, the shape of the usage-based pricing function, the optimal quantity 
discount rate, the proportion of customers adopting each pricing scheme, the monopolist's 
profits, consumer surplus and total welfare) to the model's parameters (usagemonitoring 
costs, marginal value from usage and shape of the customer distribution) is analyzed. 
%searchers have studied the optimal pricing in information systems for many years, 
most often focusing on congestion pricing. This body of work includes a queuing model of 
ASP pricing by Cheng and Koehler (1999), a model of software renting under monopolistic 
competition by Choudhary, Tomek and Chatnrvedi (1998), a general analysis of pricing 
service facilities with nonlinear delay costs, by Dewan and Mendelson (1990), a simnlation 
model of usage-based pricing in a network by Gupta et. al. (2001), which is based on 
the theoretical framework of Gupta et al. (1995), the seminal paper by Mendelson (1985) 
on pricing compnter services by internalizing delay externalities, which was followed by a 
model of variable queue pricing under asyrn~netric information by Mendelson and Whang 
(1990), and the general model of optimal IS pricing with network externalities by Westland 
(1992). Space constraints preclude a more detailed survey or analysis - these papers focus 
specifically either on contrasting usagebased pricing with alternate schemes, or on IS pricing 
under asymmetric infor~rration - which makes their models most relevant to this paper. 
Recent work-in-progress that is related includes Afeche and Mcndclson's (2001) study of 
uniform versus auctioned pricing, and Lin and Whinston's (2001) work on incorporating risk 
preferences and variable usage into software contracts. 
However, this paper represents the first formal work directly analyzing fixed-fee and non- 
linear pricing of information goods within a general framework. Two related and active areas 
of research into pricing and market segmentation - bundling and vertical differentiation (ver- 
sioning) -have indirectly shed some light on this issue. For instance, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 
(1999) show that for a general set of valuation distributions, increasing the size of a bundle 
statistically increases the average valuation placed on a randomly chosen item, and reduces 
the variance relative to its mean, which allows a seller to charge a higher average fixed fee if 
consumer valuations are unbounded. Other results suggest that mixed bundling may be o p  
timal when customer utility is bounded and linear in consumption (Chuang and Sirbu, 1998) 
and that customer heterogeneity favors bundling in specific competitive markets (Kephart 
and Fay, 2000). Typically, pure bundling is considered synonymous with fixed-fee pricing, 
and mixed bundling is equated to a mixture of a fixed-fee and usage-based pricing. However, 
this interpretation may not always be complete. Even il larger bur~dles are more vdh~able to 
customers on average, profit improvements may be possible from a mixture of fixed-fee and 
usage-based pricing for the larger bundle. This is likely to depend on the extent to which 
bundling reduces the information asymmetry about product valuation between the producer 
and consumers, and the fraction of the bundle consumed by the average customer. This 
paper provides resnlt,s that can help in addressing these issues. We discuss the implications 
of our results for bundling models in Section 5. 
The stream of literature on vertical differentiation for information goods (for instance, 
Bhargava and Choudhary, 2001, Dewan, Jing and Seidmann, 2000, Jones and Mendelson, 
1998, Varian and Shapiro, 1998, and Weber, 2001, among others) studies price discrimination 
when customers have heterogeneous preferences for quality. In general, the rest~lt,s uggest, 
that multiple versions of information goods can increase firm profits, though a result of 
Bhargava and Choudhary shows that under certain cost structures, a monopolist maximizes 
profits by offering a single version. Intrinsically, quality and quantity discrimination have 
similar objectives and use similar models, and the implications of the results of this paper 
for versioning information goods are also discussed in Section 5. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 
3 provides the general results of the paper. These results are applied to two examples in 
Section 4. The final section provides pricing guidelines, discusses pricing policy implications 
and outlines ci~rrent research. 
2 Model 
The model is described in three parts - the characteristics of the firm and customers, the 
feasible pricing schemes, and the sequence of interactions between the firm and their cus- 
tomers. 
2.1 Firm and customers 
A monopoly firm sells a homogeneous digital product, which may be used by customers in 
varying quantities. The product already exists (possibly as a result of expending a fixed 
cost). The variable cost to the firm of creating a copy of, or providing access to the product 
is zero. In addition, the variable cost to the firm from usage of the product by a customer 
is zero (apart from usage-based contract administration costs, discussed in section 2.3). 
Customers are heterogeneous, indexed by their type Q E [@,$I. The preferences of a 
customer of type 0 are represented by the linearly separable function 
where q is the quantity of the product used by the customer, and p is the total price paid by 
the customer. Given a pricing schedule, each customer chooses a usage level q that maximizes 
w. The function U is referred to as the customer's utility function. Numbered subscripts 
to U(q, 6') denote partial derivatives with respect to the respective argument. For instance, 
Ul(q, 6') is the partial derivative of U with respect to its first argument, and Ul2(q,O) is the 
cross partial of U with respect to its first and second arguments. This notation shall be used 
for partial derivatives of functions throughout the paper, except when functions have only 
one argument, in which case the usual gl( . )  notation is used. 
The utility function U(q, 0) has the following five properties; 
1. Finite maximum usage: For each 0, Ul(q,6') = 0 at  exactly one finite value of q, 
denoted a(6); Ul(q, 6) > 0 for q < a(O), and Ul(q,Q) < 0 for q > a(@). 
2. Higher types get higher utility: Uz(q, 0) > 0 for all q, 6. 
3. Spence-Mirrlees singlecrossing: For each 0, Ulz(q, 6') > 0 for all q 5 4 0 ) .  
4. Strict concavity in usage: Ull(q, 6') < 0 
5. Non-increasing absolute risk-aversion: - 
Property 1 captures the fact that customers use a finite quantity of any information good, 
even if the marginal price of additional usage is zero. This is because value from usage is 
typically bounded by a constraint on some related resource - attention or computing power 
being two common examples - and the implicit presence of a substitute use for this resource. 
Analogoilsly, sometimes the increased usage of an information good may necessitate the 
purchase of additional costly complement,ary assets like hardware. The examples in section 
4 discuss these interpretations further. 
Property 2 specifies that higher-types always get more value than lower types from the 
i~sage of a specific quantity. Propert,y 3 is t,he standard Spenc+Mirrlees single-crossing 
condition, required only in the region where U is increasing in quantit,~. The condition 
implies that in this region, higher t,ypes get a higher increase in value than lower types, from 
the same increase in quantity. Property 4 - the concavity of U in usage - is standard. 
Property 5, which is also relatively common, implies that the absolute risk aversion - a 
measure of the curvature of U - is either constant or is decreasing in type. 
The utility derived from maximal usage by type Q is represented using the function 
where a(@) = arg max U(q, 6'). Properties 1 and 2 together imply that if 6' > 8, then a(0) > 
9 
a(@, and that consequently, ~(6') > ~ ( 8 ) .  An example of the utility function, and the 
corresponding values of v(6') and a(@), is depicted in Figure 1. 
The firm does not observe the type of any c~istomer, but knows F(Q), the probability 
distribution of types in the customer population, and the corresponding density function 
f ( B ) ,  which is strictly positive for all 6' E [Q,q. The reciprocal of the hazard rate of the 
l - F  e distribution of types, %, is assumed to be non-increasing in 6' for all 6' in [@,8]. This 
is a standard assilmption in adverse selection problems, and is satisfied by most commonly 
~(3)-~(8) is used probability distributions. It also implies that for any fixed value of 8, 
f(8) 
non-increasing3 in 6' for all 6' in [Q, 81. 
2.2 Pricing 
The firm can offer one or both of two kinds of pricing (subsequently referred to as contracts): 
Fixed-fee: A fixed-fee contract specifies a price T to be paid by the cust.omer, in 
exchange for unlimited usage of the information good. There are no administration costs 
associated with a fixed-fee contract - the customer simply pays the firm the price T, and 
usage is not monitored. 
Usage-based: A usage-based contract assigns a specific price to each level of usage q. 
Since the firm cannot explicitly distinguish between customer types prior to contracting, 
the entire menu of quantity-price pairs must be available to all customers. The revelation 
principle ensures that the firm can restrict its attention to direct mechanisms - that is, usage- 
based c0ntract.s in which one specific quantity-price pair is designed for each customer, and 
in which it is rational and optimal for the cust.omer to choose the quantity-price pair that 
was designed for him or her4. The usage-based contract is represented by a menu of quantity- 
price pairs (q( t ) ,~( t ) ) ,  where t € [@,3]. This menu must satisfy a slightly modified version 
of the standard incentive-compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) constraints: 
(IC) (1) For each 8, U(q(8),8) - ~ ( 8 )  2 ~ ( q ( 8 ) ,  8) - ~ ( 8 ) ~  for all 8 # 8, q(8) 5 4 8 )  
(2) For each 8, U(q(8),8) - ~ ( 8 )  Z U(a(8),8) - ~(81, for all 8 # 8, q(8) > a(@) 
(IR) For all 8, U(q(8), 8) - ~ ( 8 )  2 0. 
The (IC) constraints are separated into two sets because Ul(q, 8) is negative for q > a(8). 
Consequently, a customer of type 8 who evaluates a quantity-price pair (q(8), T(8))for which 
q(8) > a(@) will view its value as U(a(8),8) - ~ ( 8 ) ,  rather than a s  (the strictly lower value) 
~ ( q ( 8 ) ,  8)- ~ ( 8 ) .  This is analogous to an assumption of free disposal. If q(8) > q(8) implies 
that ~ ( 8 )  > ~ ( 8 ) ,  then the first set of constraints imply the second set. 
When the menu of quantity-price pairs satisfies (IC) and (IR), every customer of type 8 
will choose the pair q(B), ~ ( 8 ) .  
The firm bears contract administration costs at the rate of c per unit usage, for each 
customer who chooses to adopt a usage-based contract. Pricing and product managers have 
indicated to the author that a reluctance to offer usage-based contracts may often stem from 
the associated administration costs - the costs that arise from having to monitor, record and 
analyze customer usage (sometimes using a remote software agent), implement non-uniform 
billing and collection on a periodic basis, the associated customer support costs from errors, 
billing dispntes, clarifications and corrections, the additional accounting costs, and so on. 
Clearly, in practice, these costs will be 11011-decreasing in the level of usage by the customer; 
for simplicity, it is assumed in the model that they are linear in q. 
2.3 Interaction between t h e  firm and customer 
The sequence of interaction between the firm and the customers is as follows: 
1. The firm designs and posts either an incentiwxompatible usage-based contract (q(.), T ( . ) ) ,  
a fixed-fee contract T. or both. 
2. Each customer either chooses a contract, or chooses not to purchase. If a customer 
chooses the fixed-fee contract, a fixed payment of T is made to the firm. Since the usage 
based contract (q(.),r(.)) has been designed to satisfy (IC) and (IR), if a customer of 
type 0 chooses the usage-based contract, then this customer uses a quantity q(O), and 
makes a payment of ~ ( 0 )  to the firm.. 
It is possible that when the customer chooses a quantity-price pair (q(O), T(@)), a copy 
of the digital product designed to be used upto a maximum quantity of q(0) is delivered to 
the customer. This is commonly observed in the software industry. In equilibrium, since the 
usage-based contract satisfies (IC) and (IR), the model is consistent with this scenario as 
well. 
The problem for a customer of type 0 is to  choose between paying a fixed fee T for a 
usage level a(@, paying ~ ( 0 )  COT a usage level y(O), or not participating. The problem of the 
firm is to choose the kinds of contracts (fixed-fee, usage-based, both) to offer, and to design 
these contract(s) to maximize ex-ante expected profits. 
The notation introduced in this section, along with some additional notation used in 
Section 3, is summarized in Table 1. 
3 Optimal Contracts 
Some (standard) terminology applied to the usage-based contracts subsequently: 
Incentive-compatible: A usage-based contract (q(.), T(.)) is said to be incentive-compatible 
if it satisfies (IC) and (IR) 
Fully-revealing: An incentive-compatible usage-based contract (q(.), T(.)) is said to be 
fully-revealing if q(B) is strictly monotonic. Under a fully-revealing contract, the type of a 
customer is revealed by his choice of q. 
Optimal: An incentive-compatible usage-based contract is said to be optimal for a 
sub-interval [OI, 821 if it yields firm profits that are at least as high as any other incentive- 
compatible usagebased contract designed exclusively for customers in the sub-interval [&, Bz]. 
When no sub-interval is mentioned, optimality applies to the entire interval [@,q 
3.1 Optimal usage-based contracts for a subset of customers 
The results in this subsection demonstrate that individual customer surplus and usage 
increase as the interval of customers for which the firm designs a usage-based contract is 
narrowed. We also describe a lemma used in all subsequent proofs of the paper's propositions. 
Suppose the firm wishes to maximize its ex-ante expected profits from customers in 
the sub-interval [@,OW], where 8u I 8, by offering them a usage-based contract. Let the 
function pairs (q(8, Bu), ~ ( 0 ,  Bu)) and (q8(B, OW), re(@, OW)) denote any incentive-compatible 
usage-based contract, and the optimal incentive-compatible usage-based contract respec- 
tively, for the subinterval [@,Bu]. When the contract is for the entire interval [@,B], the 
second argument in q and T is dropped. 
The firm's maximization problem is therefore: 
subject to the set of constraints (IC) and (IR). Proposition 1 characterizes how usage and 
individual surplus vary with the interval [@, Bv]. 
Proposition 1 As err decreases: 
(a) the usage level q'(0, O w )  of any c~istomer of type 0 < Ow strictly increases, and 
(b) the surplus U(q*(O,BLT), 8 ) - ~ ' ( 0 ,  O w )  of any cwtomer of type 0 < flu strictly increases. 
Proofs not in the main text arc provided in Appendix A. The proof of Proposition 1 
uses the following lemma: 
Lemma 1 The firm's problem when i t  wishes to maximize profits from customers in th.e 
sub-in.terval [@,Ow] by offering them a wage-based con.tract can. be reduced to: 
subject to 
ql(Or Ow) 2 0 v0 ,  
and the optimal contract (qU( . ,  O"), T*(. ,  O w ) )  for the sub-internal [e, Ow]  satisfies: 
Also, if U m ( q ,  0 )  I 0 ,  then q;(B, O W )  > 0 for all 0 for which q'(8, O w )  > 0, a d  the 
optimal contract is  therefore fully-revealing for all customers who w e  positive quantities. 
Mathematically, wit,h a little work, Lemma 1 can be deduced from Proposition 4 of 
Maskin and Riley (1984), though the specification of customer preferences and marginal 
costs is different in their model. For completeness, a (slightly different) proof of this lemma 
is provided in Appendix A. 
e 
The quantity J U2(q*(x, Oo),x)dx is often referred to as the informational rent for type 9. 
0 
-
By Lemma 1, it is exactly equal to the surplus that type 0 gets, and can be interpreted as the 
rent that the monopolist needs to  'pay' customers of type 0 in exchange for them revealing 
their true type. One might expect that lowering of the number of (IC) constraints will enable 
the firm to optimally ensure incentive compatibility at a lower level of informational rent. 
However, as the value of q'(0, flu) increases, the surplus that a type higher than 0 can get 
by choosing the quantity-price pair (q'(0, 0"), ~ ~ ( 0 ,  0 ~ ) )  also increases. As a result, as the 
firm increases the usage level q'(0, Bu) designed for type 0 in order to increase revenues, it 
also needs to increase the snrpl~is offered to each of the types higher than 0. 
Since (q'(0, OU), ~ ' ( 0 ,  OU)) is the optimal usage-based contract designed specifically for 
the sub-interval [@, Ov], the firm's profits from this sub-interval [@, Ou] are clearly at least as 
high under (q"(0,0u), ~ ' ( 0 ,  0 ~ ) )  than they would be under (q8(0),r^(0)), the contract which 
is designed to optimize profits from the entire interval. 
3.2 The impact of a fixed-fee on customer choice 
The main result of this sub-section is to establish that when a fixed-fee contract is offered 
along with any incentive-compatible usage-based contract, then the customers typically bi- 
furcate into two sub-intervals, with lower types adopting the usage-based contract, and higher 
types adopting the fixed-fee contract. The result provides a foundation for establishing the 
existence of a profit-improving fixed fee (which is proved in Section 3.3), and for then de- 
riving the optimal mix of fixed-fee and usage-based contracts, which is addressed in Section 
3.4. 
Suppose the firm has in place an incentive-compatible usage-based contract (q(.) ,~(.))  
for the entire customer interval [@,el, which may or may not be optimal. For any incentive- 
compatible contract, the proof of Lemma 1 establishes that both q(0) and ~ ( 0 )  are non- 
decreasing, and that informational rent is non-decreasing. These observations provide some 
intuition for the results that follow. 
We now analyze how customer choice is affected if the firm also introduces a fixed-fee 
contract T and leaves the usage-based contract ( q ( . ) , ~ ( . ) )  unchanged. The snrplus that 
a customer of type 0 gets from choosing the fixed-fee contract is v(0) - T. Thorcforo, a 
customer of type 6' will switch to the fixed fee contract if and only if 
where it is assumed that an indifferent customer chooses the fixed-fee contract. Note that 
equation (6) is equivalent to 
The expression on the LHS of (7)  has a simple economic interpretation. It is the difference 
between the maximum value v(0) ,  obtained from consumption of the optimal quantity a(@), 
and the informational rent [U(q(0),6') - ~ ( e ) ]  that type 8 gets from the incentive-compatible 
usage-based contract. Consequently, it is the maximum amount that the firm can charge 
for the fixed contract if the firm wishes type 6' to adopt this fixed-fee contract. Lemma 2 
shows that this amount is non-decreasing as 6' increases. 
Lemma 2 For any incentive-compatible usage-based contract ( q ( . ) , ~ ( . ) ) ,  the function 
~ ( e )  - u ( q ( o ) ,  e) + T(B)  is: 
(a) non-decreasing in 6' for all 6' in [8,8]. 
(b) strictly increasing at 8 i f  q(8) < ( ~ ( 8 )  for some 8 in [@,8]. 
(c) strictly increasing for all 6' in [@,8) if q(0) < a(@) for all 6' i n  [@,8). 
This lemma leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2 If the finn introduces a fixed-fee T in addition to an existing usage-based 
wntract ( q ( . ) , ~ ( . ) )  which is incentive-compatible in the absence of T ,  this affects customer 
choice in exactly one of the following three ways: 
(a) If v(@) - T 2 U(q(@),@) - r(@), then all customers adopt the fied-fee contmct; 
(b) If v(8)  - T < U(q(B),B) - ~ ( 8 ) ,  then all customers continue to adopt the usage-based 
contract, and 
(c) If v(@) - T < U(q(@),@) - T(@)  and v(8) - T 2 U(q(8) ,8)  - ~ ( g ,  then cvstomers of 
type 6' E [@,OF)  continue to adopt the usage-based contract, and customers of type 6' E [OF,8] 
switch to th.e fied-fee contract, where 
0~ = min(0 : v ( 0 )  - U(q(0) ,  0 )  + ~ ( 8 )  = T ) .  (8)  
The proof of this proposition is simple, and proceeds as follows. Combining (7) and the 
fact that v ( 8 )  - U(q(6'),0) +7 (8 )  is non-decreasing (as shown in Lemma 2) establishes that if 
type 8 adopts the fixed fee contract, then so do all types 8 > 8. In addition, if type 6 does not 
adopt the fixed-fee contract, then neither does any type 8 < 8. This proves parts (a) and (b). 
If the conditions for (c) hold, then since v (0 )  - U(q(B), 8)  + ~ ( 8 )  is non-decreasing in [&a], 
this ensures that there will be at least5 one type 0 for which v (0 )  - U(q(B), 8 )  + ~ ( 8 )  = T .  
Since OF is the lowest such value of 0 ,  and indifferent types adopt the fixed-fee contract, this 
proves part (c), which completes the proof. 
The clistomers in [QF,8] who switch to the fixed-fee contract will have usagelevels of 
a(0), which will be at least as high as q(0) .  In addition, so long as q(Or) < m(BF), equation 
(8 )  implies that: 
T -  OF) = v ( @ F )  - U ( ~ ( @ F ) ,  O F )  > 0, (9) 
and since v (0 )  - U(q(0) ,  8 )  + ~ ( 8 )  is non-decreasing, there will be a positive fraction of these 
customers for whom T > ~ ( 0 ) ,  and who therefore pay a strictly higher total price. Let OH 
be the highest value of 0 which satisfies ~ ( 8 )  = T. Assuming that such a value of OH exists 
in [@,GI, Lemma 2 implies that 0~ > OF. Therefore, while the fraction [OF,  Ox] pay a higher 
price, the fraction ( O H , ~ ]  will pay a lower price than they were paying under the usage-based 
contract. The firm therefore gains revenue from the fraction [OF,  O H ] ,  but may lose revenue 
from a fraction (OH,$]. The firm lowers its costs in the interval [OF,$ ] ,  as a consequence of 
having no contract administration costs from these customers. This is illustrated in Figure 
2. 
3.3 Profit-improving fixed-fees 
This stibsection establishes that the profits from the optimal usage-based contract in the 
absence of a fixed fee can always be strictly improved by the introduction of a fixed-fee. The 
proposition is stated below: 
Proposition 3 If c > 0,  then it is always strictly profit-improving for th.e firm to ofer a 
fixed-fee contract. 
Again, the proof of this proposition is relatively straightforward, and proceeds as follows. 
Let (qe( . ) ,  T * ( . ) )  be the optimal usage-based contract in the absence of a fixed-fee. This is 
simply the contract which satisfies (5) over the entire interval [@,el. According to Lemma 1, 
under this usage-based contract, the usage level of type 3 is qe(8),  which satisfies 
u, (q* ( P ) ,  3) = c. 
- - 
Since Ul(q,O) is decreasing in q, and Ul(a(0),O) = 0 by definition, (10) implies that q*(3) < 
- - 
a@), so long as c > 0, which implies that v ( e )  - U(q(0) ,0)  > 0. Therefore, there exists a 
value of T ~ ( 8 )  such that 
Since re(.) is non-decreasing, the value of T defined in ( 1 1 )  is strictly greater than rV(0) ,  
for all 0 in [@,$I. Suppose the firm offers a fixed-fee contract priced at  this value T. We 
know from Lemma 2(c) that for an optimal usage-based contract, v ( 0 )  - U(q*(0),  0 )  + ra (0 )  
is strictly increasing in [@,8). Therefore, there is exactly one type OF in for which 
Proposition 2 establishes that all customers of type 0 2 OF will switch to the fixed-fee con- 
tract. This raises the firm's revenues, since T > r'(0). In addition, the firm no longer bears 
the contract administration cost cq8(0) for customers of type 0 2 O F .  Consequently, the 
firm's profits from the custome~s in the interval [ O F , q  are strictly increased by introducing 
the fixed-fee contract T. 
Proposition 2 also shows that d l  customers of type 0 < OF, will continue to adopt the 
usage-based contract, with no impact on the firm's profits. Therefore, total firm profits 
strictly increase. This completes the proof. 
In the absence of changes to ( q * ( . ) , ~ * ( . ) ) ,  the increase in the firm's profits comes from 
two separate sources - an increase in revenues from a higher price, and a decrease in costs 
from lower administration costs. The former is feasible due to an increase in total surplus 
induced by any fixed-fee contract -each customer who adopts the fixed-fee contract chooses 
their globally optimal usage level a($),  and T can be chosen so that part of this increase in 
utility is shared by t,he firm. 
3.4 Optimal fixed-fee and usage-based contracts 
The main result of this sub-section is to show that the optimal usage-based contract in the 
presence of a fixed-fee contract is independent of the value of the optimal fixed-fee contract. 
As a consequence, the simultaneous derivation of the optimal combination of usagebased 
and fixed-fee contracts is simplified considerably. 
Proposition 3 has established the desirability of a iixed-fee contract, but does not indicate 
what the optimal value of T should be. Besides, the contract (q*(.),r*(.)) considered in 
Proposition 3 was optimal in the absence of T. When a fraction [OF,q of the customers 
no longer adopt this usagebased contract, the firm may be able to redesign the contract for 
the remaining customer types [@,OF] in a profit-improving way. This will change the value 
of the lowest type OF who is indifferent. Consequently, in order to evaluate the net profit 
impact of each feasible fixed contract, one needs to consider optimally redesigned usage- 
based contracts for a range of subintervals. In addition, it is not yet guaranteed that a 
combination of this form - a value of T, and the optimal unconstrained usage-based contrmt 
for the corresponding interval [@,OF] - is in fact the global optimum. For instance, a higher 
value of T, and a correspondingly constrained incentive?-compatible contract may actually 
yield higher profits. 
Therefore, to find the optimal combination, the firm needs to vary T, while simultaneously 
considering all feasible incentive-compatible contracts (and their profits from corresponding 
adoption) under the constraints imposed by the existence of each T. Proposition 4 describes 
the solution to this problem: 
Proposition 4 The optimal usage-based contract i n  the presence of the optim,al fied-fee i s  
independent of the value of th,e fixed-fee, and i s  identical to the optimal usage-based contract 
i n  the absence of any jixed-fee. Con.sequen.tly, the optimal combin.ation offixed-fee and usage- 
based contracts can be constructed as follows: 
(a) Determine the optimal usage-based con.tmct (q*(.), re(.)) by solving: 
(b) Find the optimal interval [q,8] which should adopt the fied-fee contract by solving: 




(c) Determine the optimal fixed-fee contract: 
The proof of Proposition 4, which is presented in Appendix A, proceeds in three stages. 
First, we characterize the subproblem of designing an optimal usagebased contract for the 
customer interval [@, @ F ] ,  subject to the requirement that every customer in [oF,fl prefers 
a fixed-fee contract with a fied value of T ,  and that all customers in [@,OF) either choose 
the usage-based contract, or choose a usage level of zero. Next, the necessary conditions for 
any solution to this subproblem (which are derived by point-matched optimization of the 
Lagrangian, as in Banker and Datar, 1989) are used to characterize the solution to the prob- 
lem of simultaneously choosing the best fixed-fee contract and usage-based contract, subject 
to the requirement that every customer in [ 8 ~ , 8 3  prefers the fixed-fee contract. Finally, the 
first-order necessary conditions for this problem immediately lead to the main result. 
Proposition 4 is a surprising result. It shows that when the firm uses the optimal fixed- 
fee contract, and this contract is adopted by a positive fraction of customers, the optimal 
usagebased contract offered to the remaining customers remains unchanged, even though 
the usage-based contract is being designed for a different (and smaller) interval of customers, 
and under an additional set of constraints. The result also reduces a fairly complex problem 
into a relatively simple sequence. Proposition 1 shows that if the firm had to design the 
optimal usage?-based contmct exclusively for a smaller interval, that the redesigned usage- 
based contract would always be different from (q*(.), T * ( . ) ) ,  and would result in higher usage 
and surplus for all the customers in the sub-interval. Furthermore, when the firm takes int,o 
account the introduction of the fixed contract, this int,roduces a new (and infinite) set of 
individual rationality inequdity constraints. These constraints make establishing sufficiency 
difficult -and the entire set of constraints changes as one varies both the level of the fixed-fee 
contract T, and the sub-interval [8F,q that the firm wants to induce to adopt T - both of 
which necessitate changes in the optimal usage-based contract. 
Proposition 4 establishes that this complicated sequence can be reduced to a simple 
problem of determining a globally optimal risage-based contract (which has a unique solu- 
tion when U122 5 O), and then solving an unconstrained maximization problem in a single 
variable. 
An immediate corollary of Proposition 4 is that the int.roduction of the optimal fixed-fee 
contract (and the consequent readjustment of the optimal usage-based contract) does not 
reduce the surplus of any customer, relative to the scenario in which only a usage-based 
contract is offered. Since the surplus of those customers adopting the fixed-fee contract 
increases6, this means that consumer surplus strictly increases as well. Proposition 3 ensures 
that firm profits also strictly increase, implying that total surplus increases as well. 
4 Examples 
The results derived in section 3 are applied in two examples, which explore the profitability 
and welfare impact of fixed-fee and usage-based contracts for different customer preferences, 
contract administration costs and customer type distributions. The first example is described 
in more detail than the second, to illustrate clearly how to use the results of Proposition 4, 
and so that the different effects on usage, profits and welfare can be precisely isolated and 
cxplaincd. 
The additional notation used in both examples is summarized in Table 2. 
4.1 Uniform customer distribution 
The first example uses a quadratic utility function of the form: 
and assumes that customer types 0 are uniformly distributed in [0,1], that is, f (0) = 1 and 
F(0)  = 0. 
(16) represents a customer utility function which is additively separable into two parts 
- a customer benefit from usage which increases linearly, and a (non-price) customer cost 
from usage, which is illcreasing and convex in usage. The customer cost could arise out 
of the need to acquire complementary assets as one increases usage. For instance, suppose 
the information good in question is Internet bandwidth. As a company increases it's use of 
bandwidth, it has to increase the capacity of switches and routers in its offices, it needs to 
acquire more disk space for caching, and it has to get more personnel for network admin- 
istration. All of these costs are generally independent of the type of customer, and simply 
depend on usage levels. Similarly, if the information good in question is corporate software, 
more usage may require more processing time on a shared set of servers. As usage increases, 
this utilization of shared processing power imposes an increasing cost on the performance of 
the customer's other softwarc. 
The parameter P influences the marginal benefit of usage linearly and uniformly across 
customer types. It is used to illustrate how pricing varies as marginal utility from usage 
is shifted. Also, it is easily verified that Ulz2(q,8) = 0, and therefore, by Lemma 1, the 
first-order conditions in (5) describe the unique optimal usage-based contract. 
The maximal usage a(0) and the corresponding value v(0) are obtained by unconstrained 
maximization of U(q, 0): 
Applying (13)  from Proposition 4 ,  one gets: 
Thcrcfore, if P > c + 1,  all types are offered positive usage, and if P 5 c + 1 ,  only a fraction 
of the types have q'(6') 2 0. We focus on the latter case7. Define OL(P,  c) as the lowest type 
which chooses a non-negative usage level: 
Under this assumption, the optimal usage levels are: 
and the optimal usage-based price for each type is: 
which solves to: 
Since q'(0) is linear in 8 ,  one can invert (20) and substitute it into (22) to yield price as a 
function of quantity: 
1 42 
~ ( q )  = 2 [ ( 1  + P + c ) ~  - (23)  
Therefore, the optimal usage-based pricing scheme is strictly concave in quantity. If one 
interprets as the standard unit price, and $ as the level of quantity discount, this 
implies that the unit price increases when either administration costs c or marginal utility 
increase. Also, since the absolute value of the discount is not sensitive to changes in c or 
p, this implies that as a percentage, quantity discounts decrease as either c or P increase. 
The optimal contract and pricing function are depicted in Figure 3. 
The first-order condition for (14) from Proposition 4 is: 
which, when solved, yields O>(P,c), the type which is indifferent between the fixed-fee and 
usage-based contract: 
It is easily verified analytically that the objective function in (24) is strictly concave in 
OF, which establishes that the necessary condition (24) is sufficient. The optimal fixed-fee 
contract is obtained by solving (15) from Proposition 4: 
Figure 3 also depicts the value of the fixed-fee contract T*(P, c), superimposed on the usage- 
based contract, and the corresponding value of B>(O, c). 
Before discussing profits ar~d welfare, we analyze the effects of varying c and f3 on cus- 
tomer adoption. Clearly, e ~ ( P , c )  is strictly increasing in c. In addition, B>(P, c) is strictly 
decreasing in c, for c between 0 and y. Consequently, as c increases in this range, the set 
of customers adopting the usagebased contract shrinks, while the set of customers adopt- 
ing the fixed-fee contract increases. However, the total fraction of customers who buy the 
product decreases. This is illustrated in Figure 4(a). The value of c = is also exactly 
the value at which B L ( ~ ,  c) = BF(P, c), at which point no customers adopt the usage-based 
contract, and all customers for whom 6' > B>(,f3, c) adopt the fixed-fee contract. 
Not surprisingly, increasing P has a strictly positive effect on adoption in general. Both 
0L(/3, C) and B>(P, c) are strictly decreasing in P - the former implies that the total number 
of adopters strictly increases in 0, and the latter implies that the number of adopters of the 
fixed-fee contract also increases in P. The function B~(0 ,c )  decreases more rapidly8 than 
B>(P,c), and therefore, the number of customers choosing the usage-based contract also 
increases in p. This is illustrated in Figure 4(b). 
Clearly, the profits from the optimal combination of fixed-fee and usage-based co~itracts 
should be higher than either the profits from offering only the optimal usage-based contract 
or the profits from offering only a fixed-fee contract. The profits from offering only the 
opt,imal usagebased contract are: 
Also, if the firm offered only a fixed-fee contract, it would set the price at w, and its 
profits%ould be: 
The firm's profits from the optimal combination of contracts are: 
S>(O,=) 
n(B. c) = J ( ~ ~ ( 9 )  - cq8(8)]ds + T*(B,  c)[1 - 8;(Bi c)]. (29) 
BL(@,c) 
The expression for c) is omitted since it is rather cumbersome. The three functions 
2 l+P are illustrated in Figure 5(a). As expected, nF(P)  = I I (P ,  y), and Ta(P, y) = 9, 
which confirms that the firm should offer only the fixed-fee contract for c 2 y. Also, 
nu(,& 0) = n(p, 0), which confirms that the firm should offer only the usagebased contract 
for c = 0. The corresponding levels of consumer surplus are depicted in Figure 5(b). 
Figure 5(a) suggests that the firm's profits are strictly decreasing in c. This is confirmed 
by differentiating (29) with respect to c: 
which is negative for 0 I c I y. However, the corresponding result does not hold for 
either consumer surplus or total surplus. Total surplus is: 
s;(P,c) 
S ~ B ,  C)  = 1 ~ ( ~ * ( 8 ) ,  8)  - cq*(e)~d8 + j U ( W ~ ,  (31) 
BL(O,C) @',(@,c) 
and consumer surplus is: 
o;(P,c) 1 
c ( ~ ,  C) = / [u(q*(e), 0) - m * ( e ) i d e t  J ~ ( 8 )  - ria, clido. (32) 
e~(ac) e;(D,c) 
Again, the expressions for these fiinctions are omitted, since they are algebraically complex 
and provide no additional insight. Both S(P, c)  and C(P, c)  are first decreasing, and then 
increasing in c, and both have a slope of zero a t  c = y. Figure 5(c) plots consumer 
surplus and tot,al s~lrplus for fixed P and varying c as a fraction of y. For all values of 
13 in the interval of interest, one can show that total surplus S(0, c)  decreases for a little 
over half the range of c, and t,hen increases subsequently until c = q, after which it is 
constant. Consumer surplus C(P, c) decreases for a small fraction of the interval, and then 
also increases steadily until c = y, after which it is constantlo. Moreover, while S(P, c)  
and n(p, c) are maximized for c = 0, consumer surplus is maximized at c = 9. 
These observations are explained in some detail in Figure 6. When c increases, there 
are two set,s of effects on total surplus. Firstly, there is a negative indirect effect - owing to 
the reduction in both the number of adopters of the usage-based contract, and the quantity 
used by each, total customer utility reduces as c increases, thereby reducing total surplus. 
In addition, there is a direct cost effect - the costs borne by the firm per unit of usage 
increase, which changes both firm profits and total surplus - however, the decrease in quantity 
demanded by the adopters of the usage-based contract may offset this unit-cost increase. 
However, there are also two positive indirect effects. An increase in c increases the number of 
adopters of the fixed-fee contract. This implies that there is a larger fraction of the customer 
population whose usage levels are at their globally optimal value (~(0) .  In addition, these 
customers no longer impose the contract administration costs cq'(0) on the firm. Both of 
these increase total welfare. 
Figure 5(c) indicates that the negative effects dominates for about the first half of the 
range 0 5 c 5 %$, after which, the positive indirect effect dominates. As c approaches y, 
the fraction of customers adopting the usage-based contract approaches zero, which is why 
the changes in total surplus also tend to zero. Finally, at c = (and beyond), there are no 
more customers adopting the usagebased contract, so further increases in c have no effect 
on surplus. 
Similarly, as c increases from zero, there are two effects on consumer surplus - a negative 
indirect effect a s  fewer customers adopt any contract, and a positive indirect effect as more 
customers shift to the fixed-fee contract. In this case, the positive effect dominates almost 
immediately. Once all the adopting customers have shifted to the fixed-fee contract (which 
occurs at c = y), there is no further impact from increasing c. Further implicat,ions of 
these results are discussed in Section 5. 
4.2 Positively-skewed customer distribution 
The next example uses a simpler quadratic utility function of the form: 
and asilrnes that customer types 0 are exponentially distributed with mean 0 ,  that is, f (0) = 
.-@/a 
P -, and F(0) = 1 - e-'/P. Relative to a flat distribution, the exponential distribution is 
positively-skewed - the mean and median are higher than the mode - in fact, f (0) is strictly 
decreasing in 0. This represents a scenario where there are a relatively higher number of 
customers who have a low utility from usage, and relatively fewer higher types". Many 
markets for information goods are well characterized by a positively-skewed type distribution, 
with a number of customers who wish to use the good only occasionally, and relatively fewer 
'power-users' whose usage levels are very high. Examples include residential Internet access, 
music and online financial information. In addition, certain types of corporate software 
display similar demand characteristics. 
Varying P varies both the mean and the shape of the distribution. An increase in 0 
shifts customer types towards the right, resulting in fewer lower-type customers and more 
higher-type customers. Consequently, the average customer type increases, as does the 
average demand. 
e2 Equation (17) implies that v(B) = and a(@) = 0. Proceeding as in section 4.1, applying 
Proposition 4 yields the optimal usage-based contract: 
q'(0) = 0 - (,B+c) for 0 2 BL(P,c); 
q'(0) = 0 for 0 < B L ( ~ ,  c), 
2 
where B L ( ~ ,  c) = (0  + c), and: 
~ ' ( 8 )  = (D + c)(8 - (p  + c)) for e 2 BL(P,c); 
= 0 for 8 < BL (p, c). 
The optimal usage-based contract is therefore linear in usage. The first-order condition f o ~  
(14) in Proposition 4 solves to: 
(P + c ) ~  
~ > ( P , C )  = 2c , 
and the optimal fixed-fee contract simplifies to: 
It can be shown that > 0 and that < 0 for all c > 0. Consequently, increases 
in c shrink the fraction of customers who adopt the usage-based contract. This segment 
shrinks to zero when c = ,6, which is the point at which BF(,L7, c) = BL(P, c); for c > P, only 
a fixed-fee contract is offered. 
Since > > 0 for a11 /3 > c, an increase in p increases the number of 
types adopting the usagebased contract, and increases the number of non-adopting types12. 
However, the shape of the distribution also changes with /3, and therefore changes in interval 
widths do not directly correspond to changes in customer density. If P > c, the fraction of 
customers adopting the fixed-fee contract is 1 - F(B;(P, c)), and the fraction of customers 
adopting the usagebased contract is F(G(P,  c) - F(BL(P, c)). Since 
is strictly negative for p > c, an increase in p results in a lower fraction of customers adopting 
the fixed fee contract. Note that these are comparative statics results - the shift away from 
the fixed-fee contract is after tsking into account the adjustments that the firm will make to 
its pricing schedule as a consequence of this increase in P - clearly, both the fixed fee and 
the usage-based fees will also increase as P increases. Also, 
is strictly positive for 0 2 c, an increase in p causes an increase in the fraction of customers 
adopting the usagebased contract. When P 5 c, (38) indicates that as P increases towards c, 
the frxtion of customers adopting the fixed-fee contract (which is the only contract offered 
in this case) increases. Figure 7 illtlstrates the customer intervals which adopt the fixed-fee 
contract, the usage-based contract and neither, as P varies. 
The firm's profits from offering just the optimal usage-based contract, from offering just 
a fixed-fee contract, and from offering *.he optimal combination of contracts, are compared 
below: 
Figure 8(a) depicts how these functions vary with c. As expected, ITV(P,O) = lT(p,O), 
and nF(p) = II(p,p), which confirm that only the optimal usagebased contract should be 
offered for c = 0, and that only a fixed-fee contract should be offered for c > P. It can 
also be confirmed that T*(P,P) = 28, the optimal fixed-fee contract in the absence of any 
usage-based contract. Figure 8(b) charts how consumer surplus varies with c. 
Under the optimal combination of fixed-fee and usage-based contracts, consumer surplus 
C(p, C) and total surplus S(P, c) solve to: 
As was the case in section 4.1, after decreasing for a while, both consumer surplus and 
total surplus increase with c, consumer surplus is maximized at  c = p, and total surplus 
decreases over a wider range of c values than consumer surplus. Again, these results are 
discussed in more detail in Section 5 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
We establish that a firm should offer its customers a combination of usage-based and unlim- 
ited usage pricing schedules, so long as the cost of administering the usage-based schedule 
is not unduly high. As the costs of administering and supporting these contracts increase, 
the desirability of non-linear pricing diminishes. However, the magnitude of thesc costs still 
play a crucial role in determining the optimal fixed-fee. 
These conclusions contrast with earlier results on pricing information goods, and from 
nonlinear pricing theory in general. For instance, in Varian (2000), it is proved that when 
customers are of two types and utility is linear in usage, a 'buy only' pricing regime (which 
corresponds to offering only an unlimited usage fixed-fee in our model) is strictly preferable 
to any pricing regime that includes renting (usage-based pricing in our model) so long as the 
transaction costs of renting are positive (non-zero administration costs c in our model). The 
result is intuitively appealing, and highlights the importance of considering usage transaction 
costs when pricing information goods. However, our results show that for a continuum of 
customer types, it is in fact optimal to offer both usage-based and fixed fee pricing, for a 
range of positive administration (or transaction) costs - we establish that the two kinds of 
pricing can optimally co-exist, by generalizing the specification of customers preferences and 
the distribution of customer heterogeneity. 
In contrast, results from nonlinear pricing theory under assumptions similar to those 
made in this paper (see, for instance, Maskin and Riley, 1984, or Wilson, 1993) suggest 
that the optimal monopoly pricing structure is purely usage-based. These models do not 
generally explicitly consider administration costs. We show that the optimdity of a pure- 
usage based contract. is highly sensitive to the absence of these administrative costs - in 
fact, Proposition 3 has established that when there are no marginal production costs from 
additional usage, a purely usage-based pricing scheme is no longer optimal for any c > 0. 
Given the fact that monitoring usage, billing and collection are always expensive, this is an 
important new conclusion for any business which is pricing information goods. 
We have also proved that the optimal usagebased contract is independent of the fixed- 
fee, which reduces a complex constrained problem to a relatively simpler and more tractable 
one. The assumptions needed on customer preferences and heterogeneity for this result 
to work arc fairly weak - they cover a vast spectrum of utility functions and distributions. 
Applying Proposition 4 is relatively straightforward, as illustrated by the examples in Section 
4. This will enable relatively easier development of focused and rigorous models for specific 
information pricing problems. 
5.1 Customer adoption and pricing structure 
As the unit cost of monitoring usage increases relative to the value customers place on 
usage, results from both the examples in Section 4 show that pricing should be altered to 
reduce the number of usagebased adopters, and that this should be accomplished not only 
by reducing the fraction of lower-valuation customers who adopt (by increasing unit prices), 
but also by shifting the high-end usage-based customers to the fixed-fee contract. When the 
opposite occurs - when the value of usage increases relative to the cost of monitoring usage 
- a firm should alter its pricing in a way that increases both the number of usagebased 
adopters, as well as its total market coverage. However, the optimal adjustment of price 
should be such that there is a larger shift towards usagebased pricing. In fact, the optimal 
price adjustments in response to an increase in product value can lower number of fixed-fee 
adopters, which indicates that the increase in fixed fee should be more than proportionate 
to the increase in value. 
The optimal shape of the usagebased pricing schedule is also sensitive to these param- 
eters. As the unit valuation of consumers increases, a firm will clearly increase its unit 
prices. However, as shown in Section 4.1, the percentage of quantity discount offered should 
progressively decrease. The intuition here is that in equilibrium, the increase in marginal 
value will cause an increase in the level of usage chosen by each customer, since the optimal 
unit price increase is a fraction of the increase in value. In addition, it is optimal for the 
firm to induce a higher fraction of the market to adopt its fixed-fee contract. The relative 
benefits of the quantity discount for the firm are conseq~ent~ly ower overall, and this nat- 
urally leads to a decrease in the discount. Additionally, when the unit cost of monitoring 
usage increases, a firm should increase unit prices and decrease in the percentage of quantity 
disco~mt. While the direction of the result is similar, the intuition is different - in this case, 
the firm actually wants to induce lower levels of usage for all adopters of the usage-based 
contract, and accomplishes this by increasing unit price - there is no corresponding increase 
in unit value driving increased usage. 
5.2 Changes in  customer characteristics and market evolution 
Many markets for information goods are characterized by a relatively high concentration of 
occasional users (or customers who place a low value on usage), and a smaller concentration 
of high-usage customers. This was the kind of customer distribution analyzed in section 4.2. 
Facing a market of this kind, a firm may be tempted to maximize its market coverage by 
offering pay-per-use pricing for the large number of low-end customers (perhaps through an 
ASP, in the case of an enterprise software manufacturer), and high-priced unlimited usage 
contracts for the high-end customers. However, our results indicate that while both types of 
contracts may co-exist, it is often optimal to price high enough exclude a substantial fraction 
(substantially higher than 5'0% in our examples) of the possible customers, all of whom are 
on the low-end of the market. While one may gain higher market coverage from an attractive 
usage-based pricing scheme, these benefits are outweighed by the cannibalization of revenues 
that could have been garnered from higher fees the high-end customers. This is a particularly 
important insight for firms that are experimenting with pricing targeted at  low-end usage, 
and monitored on per-cycle basis, for instance. The current pricing model many software 
companies use - which segments customers through a usagc-based pricing scheme by tying 
licensing fees to processor speed, and in which prices are high enough to exclude a number of 
small businesses - may be more profitable in the long nm. Administration costs are reduced 
to near zero by implementing usage limits into the software, and consequently, the fact that 
high-end software is priced almost purely based on some measure of usage is consistent with 
our model's results 
An interesting example of a shift towards more low-end customers occurred in segments 
of the enterprise software market during the dotcom boom in the late 1990's. There was a 
sudden jump in the number of early-stage companies that needed database and application 
server software to run their ecommerce sites, but whose site traffic and sales volumes required 
relatively low usage levels. Many of these companies ended up spending substantial fractions 
of t,heir budgets on licenses - far more than they would have spent if there were lower- 
priced usage-based contracts available. In fact, companies like Oracle probably suffered 
some revenue loss when hosting companies like Exodus started renting out existing software 
licenses on a monthly basis. Had Oracle responded by offering its own ASP-based monthly 
scheme, or some other kind of per-use pricing targeted at lower-end customers, it is likely 
that while they may have gained market share from some mySQL users, they would have 
lowered revenue overall. 
Often, however, the change in customer distribution over time is in the other direction - 
towards the high end. In the early stages of technology markets, is common for a relatively 
small fraction of early innovators to constitute a bulk of total usage, and for there to be a 
high concentration of occasional experimenters on the low end of the market. As the market 
matures, the usage distribution evens out, and for successful products, tends to increase on 
average. For instance, monthly usage levels per customer in the online services market have 
been steadily increasing over the last few years - a s  of late 2001, average AOL usage had 
more than doubled to about 40 hours per month - and generalizing Jupiter Media-Metrix 
survey data from May 2001 on overall residential online usage across the USA indicates that 
the distribution of usage levels per customer is flattening out, especially below the mean. 
This is the kind of distributional change corresponding to an increase in P in our example 
from section 4.2, as illustrated in Figure 7. When usage patterns in a market matures in 
this manner, it is optimal for the provider to penetrate the market with a pricing scheme 
that is biased highly towards inducing adoption of a relatively low fixed-fee, and to gradually 
increase the number of usage-based customers over time, as the average value from the service 
becomes increasingly higher than the cost of mo~iitori~lg usage. 
AOL's switch to fixed-fee pricing at a relatively early stage in the market (late 1998) is 
consistent with this prescription. However, examining AOL's pricing structure as of the end 
of 2001 suggests that substantially less than 20% of their customers are likely to be adopters 
of their usage-based contra~t '~.  This could be due to the somewhat low total dollar value of 
their service relative to usage monitoring costs. It could also be due to competitive pressure 
(there are competitors like NetZero which offer basic Internet access for less than half of 
AOL's Cied fee), though AOL does have substantial market power in residential Internet 
access. Our results suggest that as AOL strengthens its customer lock-in, it would be optimal 
for them to continue to gradually increase their unlimited usage price, and to also introduce 
usage-bmed pricing schedilles that span a wider range of their customer base. 
5.3 Implications for bundling a n d  versioning 
As mentioned in Section 1, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) have shown that it is always 
optimal for a monopoly seller of information goods to create increasingly large b~mdles. Two 
differences between our model and theirs are that we place a finite maximum on consumption 
(which arises from substitution effects, and related costs of consumption), and that we 
assume that there is always heterogeneity in per-unit customer valuations (which precludes 
the complete elimination of incomplet,e information). Consequently, our model admits a 
combination of fied-fee and usage-based pricing as the optimal solution14. In this regard, 
our results are consistent with the predictions of Chuang and Sirbu (1999), albeit in a more 
generalized model. 
Overall, however, our results do complement the basic rationale for increasing bundling. 
Onc key insight of Bakos and Brynjolfsson was that an increase in the gross size of the 
bundle of information goods increased the average per-unit customer valuation, and was 
therefore profit-improving for a firm under a fixed-fee. The bundle here can be interpreted 
as the potential set of goods the consumer might use, and not the set of goods actually 
consumed. The unit value from usage is likely to increase with the size of this bundle, and 
this will clearly increase either a fixed-fee or a usage-based price, consequently increasing 
firm profits. In addition, if the firm chooses the right combination of fixed-fee and usage 
based contracts, it will increase the fraction of customers who choose a usagebased contract 
as this per-unit value increases, and so long as the size of the bundle is finite, is likely be 
able to extract more surplus from these customers than it wollld have either under a pure 
fixed-fee, or with a smaller bundle. This suggests, for instance, that m the market for digital 
music matures and addresses its rights management issues, larger bundles of songs offered 
on a per-use basis will rewilt in higher profits per song than smaller bundles. Pressplay and 
MusicNet are therefore likely to be more profitable if they bundle their offering into a unified 
service, even if they stick with their usage-based pricing model15. 
If one were to interpret q in our model as quality instead of quantity, and 0 as the 
value different customer types place on quality, the model is identical to one of vertical 
differentiation, with a continuum of possible product versions, a continuum of customer 
types, and linear costs of versioning. In the context of information goods with multiple 
features, where quality is proportionate to the number of features, Proposition 3 indicates 
that if versioning is costly, it is always optimal to offer a high-priced version with all possible 
features, that allows customers to self-customize (that is, choose the features that they want). 
This is consistent with Bhargava and Choudhury (2001). However, our results also indicate 
that if versioning is costless, it is optimal to offer as many distinct versions as is possible, 
and to price each version individually. In addition, for low costs of versioning, it is optimal 
to offer both the 'unlimited features' version, as well as a set of limited feature versions, and 
to price each of these differently. 
5.4 Ongoing research: piracy and competition 
Apart from those considered in this study, there are two other important factors that in- 
fluence the pricing of information goods. The first is the threat of digital piracy. If one 
assnmes a constant expected vahm from pirated goods that is uniform across customers, this 
can be incorporated into our model by simply increasing the RHS of the IR constraints. 
However, the expected value of pirated informatior! goods is typically a function of both 
user preferences as well as some measure of the level of legal usage. Consequently, the IR 
constraints would need to include an additional 'piracy value' function, which depends on 
total legal usage, and on customer type. The former dependence could be internalized into 
the price using a technique analogous to a tax mechanism (Groves, 1973, Groves and Radner, 
1972), and the latter dependence may be handled using recent results due to Jullien (2000). 
A model that addresses this extension is part of ongoing research. 
The second factor of importance is the presence of competition. The cost structure of 
information goods often leads to natural monopoly, but there are instances in which price 
competition is significant. Current results on Bertrand competition with non-linear pricing 
w~ggests that undifferentiated price competition may not be sustainable for information 
goods. For instance, results from Mandy (1992) show that the equilibrium outcome is either 
minimum average cost pricing (which is not well-defined for information goods, since the 
average cost is always strictly decreasing in quantity), or pricing under which customers 
pay an average price equal to marginal cost (which implies a price of zero for information 
goods). Fishburn, Odlyzko and Siders (1997) provide one way around this, by modeling 
a repeated game in which one player chooses only a fixed-fee, and the other chooses only 
a linear usage-based price. Another approach, which may yield more general results, is if 
one models competition between differentiated information goods. This is another focus of 
ongoing research. We hope to address these open issues in the near future. 
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A Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The proof has four parts: 
(a) Reduction of ICl and IC2 t o  a simpler form: IC1 and IC2 are satisfied if 8 is 
the solution to: 
max u(rl(z, O U ) ,  8 )  - ~(21,  
.€L@"l (44) 
for all 6' in [ @ , O w ] .  The necessary and sufficient conditions for (44) are: 
(45) is the first-order necessary condition, and (16) is the second-order sufficient condition. 
Differentiating (45) with respect to 8 yields: 
which when substituted into (46) yields: 
The Spence-Mirrlees conditions ensure that Ulz(q(8, O U ) ,  8 )  > 0,  which implies that ICI and 
IC2 have reduced to: 
Since Ul(q(8, Ou), 0 )  > 0,  the fact that ql(%, BU)  2 0 implies that ~ ' ( 8 )  2 0 .  
(b) Redefining the firm's objective function: Define the w~rplns of customer type 
0 as 
= u(q(e ,  eu),e) - ~ ( 6 ) .  (50) 
Differentiating with respect to 8, and substituting (48) yields: 
(51) andproperty 2 of U(q,  0 )  imply that surplus is strictly increasing in type. Consequently, 
if IR is satisfied for the lowest type @, it is satisfied for all others. Since the firm is profit 
maximizing, it will choose s(@) = 0,  which implies that: 
e 
a(@) = / u ~ ( q ( x , o u ) , x ) d x .  (52) 
.=@ 
s (8 )  is referred to as the informational rent of type 0. Since Uz(q(x,Ocr),x) > 0,  s(8)  is 
strictly increasing if q(8,Ou) > 0.  Now, (50) and (52) imply that 
Therefore, the firm's objective function, which is: 
can be rewritten as: 
e 
Integrating the second part of (55) by parts (define G(8)  = J Uz(q(x, Ou) ,  x)dx, note that 
I=! 
@u eu 
F(@) = 0, and use S G ( Q ) f  (@do = F(Ou)G(Ou) - J F(O)dG(O)) yields: 
e=g e=e 
which can be rewritten as: 
ev 
F(Bu)-F(8) 
where H(0,Bu) = ,(@) . 
(c) Unique solution to unconstrained problem: By (57) and (491, the firm's prob 
lem is now: 
eu 
mar / lU(q(8, OU), 8 )  - 4 8 ,  Bu)  - Uz(q(@. Q u ) ,  @)H(O. 0u)If (@)do (58) 
4.) 8=8 
- 
subject to: ql(0, Ou)  2 0.  (59) 
If the unconstrained version of this problem has a unique solution for which q1(6',8U) 2 0, 
then this is the solution to the constrained problem as well. 
The unconst,rained problem can be solved by optimizing (58) pointwise to construct 
q(. ,  Ow). The first-order conditions for this problem are: 
which reduce to: 
ul (q (e ,  err), 8)  = c + u12(q(o, ew),e)  F(@a)  - F (8)  v8. f ( 0 )  (61) 
The conditions (61) arc sufficient if the function: 
is strictly quasiconcave in q.  Differentiating (62) with respect to q yields: 
Consequently, if al (q ,  8 ,  8w) = 0, (63) implies that: 
Also, Property 5 of U(q,  6') assumes that: 
which can be expanded to: 
Now, differentiating (63) with respect to q yields: 
Therefore, if ?rl(q, O , Q u )  = 0 ,  (64) and (68) imply that 
which when combined with (67) yields 
which simplifies to: 
Since U(q,  0 )  is strictly concave in q, the RHS of (71) is strictly negative. Consequently, if 
nl(q,  0, 6 ' ~ )  = 0, then ?rll(q, 0, Bu) < 0, which establishes that n(q,0, O U )  is strictly quasi- 
concave in q, which in turn ensures that for the unconstrained problem of (58), first-order 
conditions (61) yield the unique solution. 
( d )  Monotonicity of q ( 0 ,  flu) in 0: Assume that U122(q(Or O U ) ,  0 )  _< 0. Differentiating 
both sides of (61) yields: 
which implies that: 
From (68) and the fact t,hat ?r(q,@, 0u)  has been shown to be strictly quasiconcave, we know 
that the denominator of (73) is strictly positive. Also, we know that Hl(O, Bu) 5 0, since 
the reciprocal of the hazard rate has been assumed to be non-increasing. Since H(0,  0 ~ )  z 0
for all 0 in the interior of [Q,Ou], the numerator of (73) is strictly positive (since we have 
assumed that Uln(q(0, Bu), 0 )  < 0 for this part) which implies that ql(8, B U )  > 0. 
Since we know that for the optimal q*(.,Ou), necessary condition (61) has to hold for all 
q'(0, 0") > 0, this establishes that q'(0, BU) is strictly increasing in 0 when it is positive. 
This also means that if Uln(q(8, BU) ,  8 )  5 0, then the first order conditions (58) define the 
unique optimal contract qb(O, Bu).  
Proof of Proposition 1 
The first-order conditions in Lemma 1 are: 
Differentiating (74) with respect to Ou yiclds: 
which implies that 
F 0" -F(B) 
where H(8,Bu) = ( ha) . Since (74) is true for all 8, it follows that 
Also, from (67), we know that 
(77) and (78) can be combined to show that 
Since Ul(q*(8, OU),8) > 0, Ull < 0, U12 > 0 and f (8) is strictly positive, (76) and (79) imply 
that q;(B, Bu) < 0, which proves part (a) of the proposition. Finally, 
d 0 
- J u2(q*(x,8u).x)dx = j q;(x,eu)u12(q*(x,eu). x ) ~ x ,  Beu 
z=@ z=@ 
and since U12 > 0, this is strictly negative when q$(O, BU) < 0, which proves part (b). 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Define $(/I) = v(6') - U(q(6'),6') + ~ ( 8 ) .  Differentiating with respect to  8 : 
Since v(0) = maxU(q, 0), we can apply the envelope theorem to show that: 
4 
Also, incentive cornpatibilit,y of ( q ( . ) ,  T ( . ) )  impliesthat 
Substituting (8l)and (82) into (80) yields: 
Since a(@) 2 q(0) for all 0, the SpenceMirrlees condition U12(q, 0) > 0 ensures that +'(0) > 0, 
which proves part (a). Also, if ( ~ ( 8 )  > q(8) for some 8, then +'(a) > 0, which proves part 
(b). Finally, if ( ~ ( 0 )  > q(0) for all 0, then $(0) > 0 for all 0, implying that +(0) is strictly 
increasing, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The proof has three parts. 
(a) Necessary conditions for optimal usagebased contract in a fixed sub- 
interval, with a fixed T 
suppose the firm has in place a fixed-fee contract T,  which it wants only (and all) 
customers with 0 2 OF to adopt, and it wants to find the optimal usagebased contract for 
the customer interval [@,OF], given this fixed fee T. The objective function for this problem 
was derived as (57) in Lemma 1. Also, so long as the usage-based contract is incentive 
compatible and does not assign a quantity a(@) for any 0 in [@,SF], Lemma 2 implies that 
constraining customers of type OF to be indifferent between t.he fixed-fee contract T and the 
usage-based contract.(q(., OU, T), T(. ,  Bu, T)) will ensure that all types 0 < OF will choose the 
usage-based contract, and d l  types 8 1 OF will choose the fixed fee. The third argument in q 
and r ,  introduced just for the purpose of this part of the proof, indicates the dependence of 
the optimal usage-hased contract on not just Bu, but also the level of the fixed-fee contract 
T. 
We know from Lemma 1 that the surplus that a customer of type OF will get from this 
usage-based contract is 
Consequently, the firm's problem is: 
OF 
F RF -F(R) 
r ( 8 F ,  T) = mm / [ u ( q ( @ ,  O F ,  T I ,  8 )  - cq(8, O F ,  T )  - u2(4(8,  @F,T), 8 ) ( 
P(.,@V J) If (e)de,  
B 
(85) 
subject to the constraint: 
7 U 2 ( q ( 8 .  O F .  T), 8)d8 -  OF) - TI = 0. 
e 
-
Denote the Lagrangian for this problem as 
The first-order necessary conditions for any local maximizer to this constrained problem 
are: 
for all 8 < O F ,  and  
(b) Optimal fixed-fee and usage-based contract in a fixed sub-interval 
Now consider the problem of simultaneously choosing the optimal value of T and the 
optimal usagebased contract for [@,OF], subject to the requirement that every customer 
with 8 2 8 . ~  prefers T ,  and that every customer in [@, O F )  prefers the usage-based contract. 
Suppose the firm determines the function T(BF,T) as specified in (85) by solving the problem 
above for each feasible T ,  where feasibility implies the values of T for which it is feasible to 
design'an incentive-compatible usage-based contract for [d, OF]. Subsequentfly, if it chooses 
the value of T - and the corresponding optimal usage-based contract (qg(., O w ,  T ) ,  T*( . ,  Ou,T)) 
- that maximizes the sum of T(O,r,T) and the profits from the fixed fee T ,  which are 
T[ l  - F(BF)] - then it has its solution. Consequently, this problem can be formulated as 
where T(BF,T) is the value function for the problem specified in (86). The first order 
conditions for this problem are: 
To determine T2(eF,T), one can differentiate (85) with respect to T:  
While (88) is not a sufficient condition, it is necessary, and therefore holds for the optimal 
usago-based contract. Since it is true for every f3 in [@,OF],  we can substitute it into (92) to 
get: 
OF 
' r2 (h lT)  = -A(T) lq;(e.~~.~)u.~(q*(e.e~,~).e)de. (93) 
6 
-
Also, the optimal usage-based contract for any feasible fixed T satisfies (89). Differentiating 
both sides of (89) with respect to T yields: 
Combining (93) and (94) gives us the following value for T 2 ( e ~ ,  T ) :  
(95) is a familiar constraint-relaxation result - that the marginal value of relaxing a con- 
straint is equal to the Lagrangian multiplier for that constraint. Now, substituting (95) into 
(91) gives us the value of X(T) in the problem specified by (85) and (86), for the optimal 
fixed-f& contract T*: 
X(T) = -[I - ~(e , ) ] .  (96) 
Since we now have the value of X(T^), we can characterize the opt.imal usage-based contract 
which corresponds to this optimal fixed-fee T*, by substit~iting (96) into (88): 
which simplifies to 
(c )  Optimal contracts for entire interval 
Equation (98) implies that the usage-based quantity assigned to each type O in [@,OF] is 
independent of OF. Also, from Lemma 1, (98) is identical to the specification of the optimal 
usage-based contract for the entire interval [@,8]. Propositions 2 and 3 ensures that so long 
as c > 0, if the optimal combination of a usagebased contract T* and fixed-fee contract 
(qe(.),r*(.)) for the entire interval [@,4 involves any customer choosing the usage-based 
contract, it will result in some sub-interval of the customers [ O > , q  choosing the fixed-fee 
contract, and the others choosing the usage-based contract. However, this global optimum 
also has to be an optimal solution for the problem under which customers in the pre-specified 
interval [@, 0;) choose the usage-based contract - in other words, it has to  be a solution to 
the problem in part (b), where OF = &. As a consequence, it has to satisfy the necessary 
condition (98). This proves that the optimal usage-based contract is independent of the 
fixed fee. Part (a) immediately follows immediately from Lemma 1. 
The value of the fixed-fee at which type OF is indierent is v(OF) -U(q*(e~),  O p )  +r8(Op). 
Part (b) follows from the fact that firm will choose the profit maximizing value of VF, and 
that the corresponding optimal usage-based contract (q*(O),r*(O)) is independent of the 
choice of 8;. Part (c) simply computes the fixed-fee T* at this optimal value of 8;. This 
completes the proof. 
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Table 1: Summary of Notation introduced in  Sections 2 and 3 
Symbol 
u ( q ,  8 )  
~ ( 8 )  
4 0 )  
18, el 
f (017 F(8 )  
4(0) ,  4 0 )  
q*(% ~ * ( 8 )  
~ ( 0 ,  ow), ~ ( 0 ,  ~ )  






Ut,ility that customer type 8 gets from usage level q. 
Maximum utility that customer type 8 can get from usage. 
u(8) = max U(q ,  8 ) .  
4 
Usage level at which utility for type 8 is maximized. 
a ( 8 )  = arg max U(q ,  8 ) .  
9 
Range of possible customer types 8. 
Density and distribution functions of customer type 
distribution. 
Usage-based contract (continuous set of quantity-price pairs) 
that is incentive compatible for [@,a].~or a specific value of 
0 ,  q(0)  is the quantity and ~ ( 8 )  is the price for that quantity. 
Optimal usage-based contract that is incentive compatible 
for [e, 81. 
Usage-based contract that is incentive compatible for [@, B U ] .  
Optimal usage-based contract that is incentive compatible 
for [@,001- 
Unlimited-usage fixed fee price. 
Unit cost of contract administration for a usagebased 
contract. 
Lowest customer type which is indifferent between a specified 
bed-fee and usage-based contract 
Lowest customer type for whom T = ~ ( 8 ) .  
Table 2: Summary of Notation introduced in Section 4 
bination of fixed-fee contract and usage-based contract, for 
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usage level q b 
Figure 1: Illustration of U(q ,8) for two different values of 9 
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Figure 3a: Optimal Contract q*(-),z'c) 
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Figure 3b: Pricep(q) as a function of usage 
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Figure 4a: Impact of increasing c on customer choice 
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Figure 4b: Impact of increasing P on customer choice 
Figure 5a: Firm profits - fixed-fee, usage based and combination 
Figure 5b: Customer surplus - fixed-fee, usage based and combination 
Figure 5c: Customer and total surplus as c varies 
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Figure 6: Changes in total surplus as c varies: a closer look 
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Figure 8b: Customer surplus - fixed-fee, usage based and combination 
Figure 8c: Customer and total surplus as c varies 
